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ABSTRACT 
Extensive evidence compiled over the past decade demonstrates that many species of 
animals respond negatively to inequity across several different contexts. One context that 
remains unexplored is whether inequity responses are influenced by the experimenter. 
Experimenter effects remain an enduring concern within animal research. I investigated whether 
the presence of the experimenter influences responses to inequity in a nonhuman primate species, 
the capuchin monkey (Cebus apella). In the presence or absence of an experimenter, monkeys 
worked in pairs to complete a computerized task, following which individuals received rewards 
that were either equal or unequal in comparison to the partner’s rewards. Monkeys had difficulty 
learning the task, but after learning, rates of refusals were influenced by the individual reward 
received rather than the social comparison or the actions of the experimenter. I consider reasons 
for their frustration with the task and their subsequent lack of an inequity response in this 
context. 
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1     INTRODUCTION  
Several species of animals respond negatively to inequity, and research continues to 
explore how this response is influenced by different external factors. The negative response to 
inequity occurs in several primate species (Brosnan, 2006; de Waal, 1996; Flack & de Waal, 
2000), as well as non-primates (dogs: Horowitz, 2012; Range et al., 2009; Range et al., 2012; 
corvids: Wascher & Bugnyar, 2013). One common experimental testing procedure to study the 
inequity response involves having animals complete a task with a human experimenter in order 
to receive a food reward. Two participants, one acting as a subject and the other as a partner, sit 
adjacent to one another in front of the experimenter and alternate participation, allowing them to 
observe what tasks the other completes and what reward the other receives (c.f. Brosnan & de 
Waal, 2003). Generally, their responses when the partner received a better food reward are 
compared to their responses in a baseline condition in which both individuals received a lower-
value food reward, and a negative response to inequity is inferred through the frequency of 
refusals to exchange or refusing to consume the food reward.  
However, the effect of the experimenter on this phenomenon has yet to be determined. A 
major concern in psychology is how experiments are affected by the very artificiality of the 
procedures (Davis & Balfour, 1992; Rosenthal, 1963; Rosenthal & Halas, 1962). Do individuals 
respond as they perceive the experimenters desire?  Are their behaviors influenced by the setup 
in ways that human experimenters may not recognize?  These concerns warrant a proper 
evaluation of what effects experimenters may have on results, both related to the inequity 
response and beyond.  Experimenter effects have not received much attention in animal research 
as compared to human research (Davis & Balfour, 1992), which is problematic since results rely 
on overt behavioral measurements rather than introspection. This may be even more important in 
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cognitive and behavioral research with captive animals, since researchers often are intimately 
involved in the testing procedures. Moreover, the majority of research that has been done on 
experimenter effects investigates individual animals’ behavior outside of a social context (Kintz 
et al., 1965; McGuigan, 1963), but how might an experimenter affect social animals that must 
solve problems in social contexts? The current study focuses on the latter concern in the context 
of experimenter-induced inequity. 
Anecdotal accounts suggest that the experimenter may play an influential role in the 
response to inequity. In his studies on contrast effects, Tinklepaugh described a response in 
which the macaque subjects sometimes “looked or even shrieked ‘accusingly’ (if so 
anthropomorphic a term may be used) at the experimenter or onlookers” (1928, p. 233) after the 
subjects discovered a preferred reward had been surreptitiously replaced with a less-preferred 
reward. Also, chimpanzees that are treated inequitably will scream or throw the tokens at human 
experimenters instead of the conspecific partner, although these responses are sufficiently 
uncommon that they have not yet been empirically explored. Since the response to inequity 
requires an individual to pay attention to the rewards that another individual receives as 
compared to one’s own rewards, it is important to investigate what role the experimenter may 
have in this interaction, and what a response directed towards the human rather than conspecific 
might mean. Specifically, is the social comparison alone enough to elicit the inequity response, 
or might animals perceive the experimenter as causing the inequity? Therefore, in this study I 
explored the influence of an experimenter’s presence on the responses to inequity in one species 
of nonhuman primate, the capuchin monkey (Cebus apella). This study implemented new 
methodology that enabled an experimenter to be present or absent in order to better determine 
whether the experimenter affected the type of response to inequity. 
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1.1 The Inequity Response  
Studying the response to inequity can provide us with a better understanding of a related 
concept in humans, fairness. The concept of fairness is highly developed in humans and 
pervasive in many aspects of our culture. Fairness, defined as the distribution of costs and 
benefits from a joint activity, is complex, involving both receiving less (disadvantageous 
inequity) and receiving more (advantageous inequity) than another individual (Fehr & Schmidt, 
1999; Hatfield et al., 1978). These concepts have been studied extensively in the field of 
behavioral economics and psychology, where it has been demonstrated that humans react 
negatively to receiving a different outcome than a social partner. Fairness in humans also 
incorporates inherent social norms and standards, and ties into complex emotions such as greed 
and envy (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Hatfield et al., 1978). Fairness is a complex, socially-based 
concept that is linked to morality (Frank, 1988), which implies an underlying motivation to 
maintain equity and maintain social norms. Although other species do not share the complete 
sense of fairness that humans often exhibit, they do show aspects of it, which can be studied 
empirically (Brosnan, in press).  Additionally, even in humans, we cannot fully understand 
“fairness” without understanding its constituent parts.  Typically this is done by exploring 
subjects’ responses to unequal outcomes, or inequity aversion. 
Inequity aversion in humans may be influenced by many things, including an individual’s 
culture (Henrich et al., 2001), personality (Colquitt et al., 2006; Wiesenfeld et al., 2007), and the 
quality of the relationship between the individuals involved (Attridge & Berscheid, 1994; Clark 
& Grote, 2003); nonetheless, these responses are largely present across different societies and 
contexts (Haidt, 2012). Aside from behavioral consistency, there is also neurological evidence of 
consistent responses to inequity across humans.  Unfair offers elicit activity in areas of the brain 
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associated with negative emotional affect and physical disgust (Sanfey et al., 2003). Considering 
this widespread consistency in multiple domains, inequity aversion may be considered a 
universal human cognition (Henrich et al., 2001). Thus, recent research has focused on 
examining why this behavior may have evolved – what the function is, why it is of importance, 
and what causes the variation we see among individuals and cultures.  
A negative response to inequity occurs when an individual’s expectations are violated 
based on a comparison of one’s own efforts and rewards with the effort and rewards of a social 
partner. These responses to inequity come in different forms. In their typical social interactions, 
animals sometimes react in ways that indicate that they are not satisfied with their outcomes. For 
example, chimpanzees will often have temper tantrums when they do not receive what they want. 
Such tantrums might occur both with kin or non-kin, as for instance when offspring protest if 
their mother does not share (de Waal, 1996). These reactions are not limited to feeding 
situations. One male chimpanzee would display tantrums when he began losing female support 
in a struggle for dominance against another male; when females refused to extend support, or 
avoided him, he would throw himself on the ground and roll around screaming (de Waal, 2007).   
Such behavior is not limited to primates. Canids have a set of social rules surrounding 
social play (i.e. what signals to display, how rough to play), and these rules are maintained as a 
group norm (Bekoff, 2001). Social play often involves action patterns used in other contexts, like 
predatory behavior, and therefore, it is crucial that canids display signals that demonstrate the 
desire to play before initiating these action patterns. Moreover, individuals that follow the social 
rules will self-handicap to reduce asymmetries in a play interaction; for example, an individual 
may not play as aggressively if the playmate is younger. Individuals that violate these rules or 
deceive playmates (such as displaying a play signal but acting inappropriately aggressive 
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towards the playmate) are not selected as play partners as often as those who do not violate these 
social rules. Ravens also follow a social norm in which an individual that possesses food can 
maintain possession in the presence of other individuals; those that violate this norm by 
attempting to steal food from the possessor will be attacked in an apparent instance of third party 
enforcement (Heinrich, 1999).  
Of course such observations are intriguing, but do not provide the level of empirical 
support possible through controlled experiments.  While we do not expect to see a full sense of 
fairness in other species, evidence is building that several species, including nonhuman primates, 
share at least some underlying behaviors related to fairness (Brosnan & de Waal, 2012). 
Specifically, we can test whether they monitor their own outcomes compared to those of a social 
partner, and whether they recognize and respond to discrepancies. Therefore, we can use 
nonhuman primates as a model system to study the precursor behaviors from which fairness may 
have evolved. We can study elements of fairness in other species, which may someday tell us the 
ways in which our own sense of fairness is and is not unique.  
1.2 What Does Inequity Look Like in Other Species? 
Studies on the inequity response in animals generally measure subjects’ reactions to 
getting a different reward as compared to a partner, subsequent to both individuals completing 
the same work (Brosnan, 2006a). In the typical procedure, two subjects from the same social 
group, seated adjacent to one another, alternate performing a task (such as exchanging a token 
with a human experimenter) for a reward. The subject in question receives less than 
(disadvantageous inequity) or more than (advantageous inequity) the partner, and their response 
is compared to a control condition when both receive the same food reward. The subjects can 
easily observe the task that the other individual completes and the reward they both receive 
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during these interactions. Behavioral responses generally manifest as negative reactions such as 
refusing food rewards or refusing to continue participating in the task, and individuals may even 
toss the food reward at the experimenter. 
One immediate finding is that the response is quite variable across contexts and 
individuals.  In fact, responses amongst primates are not always consistent, even within the same 
species or within the same study (e.g., Brosnan et al., 2005; Brosnan et al., 2010b). This causes 
two problems; first, it is difficult to use a “check-box” approach to determine which species do 
and do not show the reaction.  This is exacerbated by the fact that procedures and methodology 
vary among studies, and it is not always clear how to interpret two conflicting results.  Second, 
this variability makes finding underlying causes and mechanisms more challenging, as they 
presumably interact with other features of the individual, the relationship, and the context. 
Past studies on inequity have manipulated one (or more) of several factors to determine 
which features are more likely to lead to a negative reaction to inequity. These factors include 
the type of task (if any), the seating arrangement of subjects, and the distribution of rewards. One 
critical feature that has not yet been manipulated is the presence or identity of the experimenter.  
Given that the experimenter is the individual causing the inequity, this seems a critical next step. 
1.2.1 Individual vs. Social Contrast 
An important aspect in studying inequity is implementing the correct methodology to 
more clearly distinguish contrast effects from social comparison effects. Inequity differs from 
contrast effects by the referent of the comparison. Inequity is the comparison of an individual’s 
own rewards to a partner’s rewards (or social contrast; Brosnan, 2011), while contrast effects are 
the comparison of an individual’s current rewards to a previously received reward or something 
in the environment (or individual contrast; Reynolds, 1961). Contrast effects were first studied in 
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macaques by Tinklepaugh (1928). Monkeys watched as the experimenter hid preferred food 
items under cups, which the monkeys could then access the next day.  Sometimes, these 
preferred food items were surreptitiously replaced with non-preferred items (i.e., lettuce), and 
monkeys responded negatively when outcomes violated their expectations (i.e., receiving lettuce 
rather than the preferred food item). These contrast effects are widespread across different 
species (Range et al., 2012; Roma et al., 2006; Talbot et al., 2011; Wascher & Bugnyar, 2013). 
Contrast effects are essential to control for in order to determine whether “inequity” responses 
are actually social in nature, or whether the social partner is irrelevant.  In other words, it is 
possible that in the response to ‘inequity,’ the individual is responding to the presence of a higher 
value reward, not to a social partner receiving that higher value reward. 
To discriminate these possibilities, many researchers have included controls to 
differentiate between inequity responses and contrast effects.  For instance, in one common 
control, subjects are shown one reward, then provided a different reward after completing a task; 
this entire procedure is done while seated next to a partner, who also is offered a different reward 
than they eventually receive (Brosnan et al., 2010b).  In such tests, chimpanzees and capuchins 
do not react as strongly in the control (contrast) condition as they do in the inequity condition, 
where the partner received a better reward than the subject. This implies that nonhuman primates 
were indeed responding to the social contrast of the situation.  On the other hand, squirrel 
monkeys show the opposite pattern, responding more strongly to individual than social contrast, 
although this is only the case in males; females respond to neither inequity nor contrast (Talbot et 
al., 2011). This difference between two very closely related primates (capuchin monkeys and 
squirrel monkeys are part of the same taxonomic Family) emphasizes the variability in this 
response across the Primates. 
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1.2.2 Task 
The type of task (or the absence thereof) has a major influence on how subjects respond 
to inequity.  Nonhuman primates are more likely to respond to unequal rewards when effort in 
the form of a task is required than they are to receiving rewards for “free” (i.e., not having to 
complete a task to receive the rewards), in which case no response to inequity has ever been 
documented (Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; Brosnan et al., 2010b; Brosnan et al., 2011a; Freeman et 
al., 2013; Neiworth et al., 2009; Talbot et al., 2011; van Wolkenten et al., 2007).There are 
several possible explanations for this.  First, studies testing the negative response to inequity 
involve captive animals, who regularly receive food provisioned by human caretakers. Food is 
often distributed unequally, either because some animals need more or because dominants are 
more likely to receive food.  The latter may be because they are more likely to come up and 
accept food from an experimenter or because they actively block subordinates from receiving 
food.  As a result, some individuals are accustomed to getting more (or less) food than others and 
so may learn that there is no point in protesting food being handed out for “free.”  
Additionally, the presence of a task may cue the subject to a context in which sensitivity 
to inequity is important. That is, if a purpose of inequity aversion is to help individuals recognize 
and avoid those situations in which a partner is receiving a greater benefit for a joint interaction 
(e.g., cooperation, see Section 1.4, below), then inequity aversion is more important in contexts 
in which there has been joint interaction than those in which there has not.  This may cause 
individuals to respond differently when they work for the rewards than in those “gift reward” 
situations in which no task is present (Bräuer et al., 2006; Dindo & de Waal, 2007; Roma et al., 
2006).  
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Therefore, one critical element of designing any study of inequity, including the current 
one, is including a task.  Although the majority of studies have relied on an exchange paradigm, 
recent evidence indicates that individuals respond similarly to different types of tasks (e.g., a 
targeting task versus an exchange task; Freeman et al., 2013).  Incorporating a task was a 
challenge in this study, which was designed to test the role of the experimenter in subjects’ 
responses, because it required conditions in which no experimenter was present.  Exchanges and 
other typically-employed tasks are impossible in the absence of an experimenter; therefore, I 
developed a computerized task that allowed me to maintain a task even in the absence of the 
experimenter (see Section 2.3, below). 
1.2.3 Subjects’ Relative Position and Control of Reward Distribution 
Small differences in experimental protocols, such as how the subjects are seated with 
respect to one another, may make big differences in responding to inequity. Takimoto et al. 
(2010) found behavioral differences in capuchins based on visual contact, which suggests that 
any sense of separation, either visually or physically, affects behavior. Additionally, orientation 
may play a role.  There is great variability in responses in chimpanzees and, while multiple 
factors vary, one feature that may be important is relative position; individuals responded to 
inequity when seated next to one another in a shared enclosure (Brosnan et al., 2005; 2010b) but 
not when seated across from one another in separate enclosures (Bräuer et al., 2006; 2009).  In 
humans, the orientation of the subjects has also proven important (Sommer, 1965; 1967). 
Humans prefer to sit opposite one another in competitive tasks, apparently due to a strong 
interest in eye contact in a competitive situation, but prefer to sit adjacent to each other in 
cooperative ones. Unfortunately subjects’ relative positioning is something that is often beyond 
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the control of researchers, particularly with large species such as the great apes (and positioning 
may not always affect behavior; e.g., Silk et al., 2005).   
Aside from physical orientation, the degree of contact between subjects may play a role. 
A vital part of the inequity paradigm is that individuals expend effort on a task and receive the 
rewards that are intended for them. Consequently, if the subject that is designated as the 
disadvantaged individual ends up stealing the better rewards from their partner (common 
behavior from dominant individuals), we will not be able to measure an appropriate response to 
inequity. To control this, subjects are often separated from one another (e.g., by a mesh 
partition), which reduces stealing without requiring the intervention of the experimenter (which 
may also lead to experimenter influences on subjects’ behavior; see Chapter 2). However, this 
separation may also inhibit reactions to unequal outcomes, due to decreased proximity between 
the animals (Talbot et al., in prep). This creates a problem for studies like the current one, 
without an experimenter.  Given that capuchins do respond in some situations with a barrier 
(Brosnan et al., 2010b; Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; van Wolkenten et al., 2007), I chose to 
include a barrier in order to maintain the reward division in the experimenter absent condition.      
1.3 Experimenter Effects 
A consequence of working with animals in a laboratory setting is that over repeated 
interactions, humans and animals form relationships that can affect both the humans’ and 
animals’ behavior. Human experimenters may form different behavioral expectations for certain 
animal subjects, which may lead to cuing.  Moreover, animals can discriminate among humans, 
causing them to act differently in the presence of certain individuals based on factors such as 
familiarity and the nature of interactions (Davis, 2002), which can ultimately affect cognitive 
performance and motivation in tasks (Cibulski et al., 2014). For example, some animals may be 
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more neophobic to unfamiliar individuals (Russel, 1973). Research is lacking on experimenter 
effects on the response to inequity, although it is an important issue to study for both practical 
and theoretical reasons.  Below I discuss several of these issues in more detail. 
1.3.1 Unintentional Cuing and Reinforcement 
A big concern in animal research is that, despite implementing controls to encourage 
natural behavior, humans will emit unintentional cues, influencing the animals to act in a certain 
way to get a desired result. The effects of experimenter characteristics on animal behavior were 
first investigated by Carl Stumpf and Oskar Pfungst in 1904 in the famous case of Clever Hans, 
the horse that could ostensibly count. It was determined that unconscious cuing and 
reinforcement from the horse’s trainer were driving this behavior (Pfungst & Stumpf, 1907). The 
“Clever Hans effect,” in which an animal responds in the way in which the experimenter 
seemingly wants the animal to respond, remains an important factor to control for in 
experimental studies.  
Since that time, researchers have found that experimenters may influence every step of 
the experimental process, from implementing the independent variables and handling subjects to 
measuring and reporting data (Kintz et al., 1965). A problematic phenomenon occurs when an 
experimenter receives feedback from an experiment through observing a behavior or partial 
result, creating a bias in the experimenter regarding predictions about general principles and 
expectancies for future responses (Rosenthal & Fode, 1963). Although this process is not well 
understood, it is possible that the experimental feedback might change the mood of the 
experimenter if data contradict the hypothesis or it might exaggerate an interpretation if the data 
do support a prediction. Either way, these types of biases run the risk of contaminating 
subsequent results and interpretations.  
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One study found that experimenters’ expectancies of what they will observe in subjects 
can influence data obtained; experimenters were provided instructions involving what 
frequencies of contractions and head turns to expect in planaria undergoing classical 
conditioning, and although subjects’ responses were not affected, the experimenters reported the 
frequencies that they expected to see (Cordaro & Ison, 1963). In another study looking at rats’ 
performances in a simple T maze, subjects were randomly assigned to one of two groups of 
experimenters. One group was instructed that their subjects were “maze-bright” (bred for 
brightness) and the other experimenter group was instructed that their subjects were “maze-dull”. 
Despite random subject assignment and arbitrary labels given to the two groups, the supposed 
“maze-bright” rats performed significantly better than the “maze-dull” rats (Rosenthal & Fode, 
1963). It is possible that the experimenters’ expectancies based on the instructions they received 
may have influenced their attitudes, which may have caused differences in signals transmitted 
through tactual and sensory modalities or differences in handling the animal subjects. A recent 
study specifically assessed how observer expectancies influence subjective scoring of behavior. 
Veterinary students applied different scoring methods in which they were shown duplicated 
video recordings of the same animals, an original version and a slightly modified version of the 
same clip. When scoring the clips, the students were provided either false or correct information 
about the conditions in which the animals had been filmed. In all trials, there was evidence that 
expectation bias formed from the contextual information provided influenced how the students 
scored the identical behaviors they observed (Tuyttens et al., 2014). 
Indeed, the way humans handle animal subjects may also cause behavioral differences.  
In a study on the effects of alcohol on learning the avoidance response in rats, the alcohol itself 
did not produce any differences in results. However, differences were observed based on the 
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team of experimenters employed to handle the animal subjects (Harris et al., 1964). Even the 
experimenter’s personality and experience level can influence responses. McGuigan (1960) 
compared experimenters’ traits scores on personality tests with behavioral scores of human 
subjects and found high correlations; for example, subjects performed more poorly with more 
neurotic experimenters. In another study, naïve and experienced experimenters each trained a 
group of rabbits on a conditioned shock-avoidance response and recorded acquisition speeds. 
The rabbits of the experienced experimenters reached criterion faster, and when a naïve 
experimenter was provided another group to train, there was a significant practice effect 
(Brogden, 1962).  
These effects are all based on rather large experimenter influences, but nonhuman 
primates may be sensitive even to the eye movements of the experimenter (Povinelli & Eddy, 
1996), which means that experimenters must work very hard to avoid unintentional cuing. In 
some cases, experimenters have worn sunglasses or baseball caps to avoid cuing by eye gaze 
(Call, 2001; de Blois et al., 1998; Pepperberg et al., 1997), but eye gaze is not the only type of 
unintentional cuing. Even subtle body movements may provide cues that can alter animals’ 
performances. This concern is not limited to primates; Johnson (1913) showed that allegedly 
successful auditory discrimination made by dogs were actually the result of a reliance on subtle 
cues provided by the experimenter, such as respiration, posture, and the tensing and relaxing of 
muscles. The dogs were no longer able to discriminate when experimenters who were interacting 
with the animals or collecting data were blind to the conditions and desired results.  
Not surprisingly, given how good animals are at discerning unintentional cues, they may 
also evaluate interactions between experimenters and learn the reputation of an experimenter 
based on these interactions. Indeed, several species of primates seem to be aware of others’ 
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intents and can distinguish between the intentional and accidental acts of an experimenter (Call 
et al. 2004; Phillips et al. 2009; Wood et al. 2007). In these studies, typically framed as whether 
or not animals can learn reputations, individuals either interact with two experimenters, one of 
whom gives rewards (i.e., the generous experimenter) and one of whom does not (i.e., the selfish 
one), or watch another individual interact with them. When given a choice between 
experimenters, chimpanzees prefer to interact with the generous one whether they have personal 
experience with them (Subiaul et al., 2008) or have just watched another chimpanzee interact 
with them (Russell et al., 2008). Dogs show the same preference (Kundey et al., 2011; Marshall-
Pescini et al., 2011). It may be that the apes’ and dogs’ ability to learn reputation are based on an 
understanding of the experimenter’s intent, either due to advanced cognition or specific selection 
to pay attention to human cues, as with dogs (Hare & Tomasello, 2005).  
On the other hand, capuchin monkeys, who are also highly cooperative and respond to 
inequity, do not discriminate between experimenters who “cheat” by failing to give offered 
rewards and those who do not (Brosnan & de Waal, 2009; see also Sheskin et al., 2013). 
However, capuchins do clearly discriminate experimenters and pay attention to their behavior; 
monkeys look longer at humans who imitate them, and they also spend more time in proximity 
and choose to interact more frequently with these imitators (Paukner et al., 2009). Capuchins 
also can point to communicate to a cooperative human (Mitchell & Anderson, 1997). Therefore, 
if capuchins do take into consideration past experiences with a human, we might expect that 
capuchins would respond differently to inequity based on the relationship with a specific human 
experimenter.  
Like any experimental paradigm, the inequity response may be influenced by 
experimenters in the ways discussed above. One concern is that all of the previous task-based 
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experiments have required interaction with an experimenter, who distributes rewards to the 
correct individuals. This ultimately means that the experimenter must know the condition ahead 
of time, so as to provide the correct individual with their respective reward. With this knowledge, 
it is possible that the experimenter might be unintentionally cuing the subjects to respond in a 
certain way that would fit the predictions for that condition. For example, unintentional cuing via 
body language or watching the animal perform a task could affect motivation levels or 
performance on the task. Moreover, the experimenter’s cuing might unexpectedly promote a 
negative reaction (or the animals may refuse to work due to experimenter influences rather than 
noticing and responding to the actual inequity).  
In the recent exchange-based studies, there have been safeguards built in to avoid 
potential cuing. Experimenters will give subjects a consistent (and typically considerable) 
amount of time to respond without the experimenter feeling pressured to get the animal’s 
attention, and individuals who are blind to conditions (e.g., not the experimenter collecting the 
data) can code for behavioral reactions. While these procedures ensure that the experimenter and 
the blind coder reliably agree on the response, it does not necessarily prevent the experimenter 
from cuing in the first place. For the current study, the main focus was to avoid any experimenter 
cuing by removing the interaction with the experimenter and most critically, by providing a 
control to see how the monkeys responded in the complete absence of an experimenter. To 
remove experimenter interaction, I implemented a computerized task instead of an exchange-
based paradigm, and rewards were provided via an automatic dispenser. Also, because the 
experimenter was not directly interacting with the subjects and the reward distribution was 
automatic, cuing was less of a concern when the experimenter was present, too, even though the 
experimenter was not blind to the condition. 
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1.3.2 Relationship with the Experimenter 
While we have strong evidence that animals are sensitive to cues given by experimenters 
within a study, one feature that has been poorly explored is how the relationship between the 
experimenter outside of the experimental context influences the subjects’ behavior in studies of 
behavior and cognition.  This is potentially important for tests in which experimenters create 
inequity.  In humans, responses to inequity differ depending on the relationship between the 
individuals involved (Clark & Grote, 2003), and this may be the case in other species as well. 
Although no study has directly addressed inequity, we do know that animals are sensitive to 
these relationships.  One study suggests that the length of time working with an animal may 
influence their behavior in cognitive tasks. Corvids are sensitive to familiarity of an 
experimenter, participating more often and showing better performance in an exchange task with 
an experimenter with whom they have a more long-term relationship as compared to an 
unfamiliar experimenter (Cibulski et al., 2014); however, the possibility of experimenter effects 
cannot be ignored. Additionally, features of the experimenter may influence behavior prior to 
interaction. Female dogs readily approach unfamiliar humans of either sex, but male dogs tend to 
avoid unfamiliar male humans (Lore & Eisenberg, 1986).    
Another consequence in captivity is that for some individuals, the interaction with the 
experimenter may be more rewarding than the reward itself, which means that the responses of 
the animal are not based on the reward distribution that the experimenters provide. This may be 
especially likely in domesticated animals or animals that interact intensively with humans, in 
which social interaction with the experimenter may have a higher value than the actual food 
reward since these animals are so accustomed to human attention and affection. In addition, 
because captive and domesticated animals are trained to obey human commands, animals could 
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be completing the task just to please the experimenter, without paying attention to the partner’s 
efforts and reward outcomes. Therefore, the opportunity to interact with a human may 
overshadow any negative response or distract the animal from paying attention to a partner’s 
efforts and reward outcomes. Additionally, the reaction to inequity may consequently be directed 
more towards the experimenter.    
In a recent inequity study, dogs responded to an unequal distribution of rewards when 
tested with a conspecific, but they did not indicate sensitivity to quality of food or effort 
expended (Range et al., 2009), whereas nonhuman primates have shown this sensitivity (Massen 
et al., 2011; van Wolkenten et al., 2007). It has been postulated that the dogs reacted more to the 
commands of experimenters rather than responding to the quality and effort inequity conditions 
(Horowitz, 2012; Range et al., 2009; 2012). Therefore, it is plausible that nonhuman primates in 
captivity that are used to interacting with humans and obeying human commands may be prone 
to a similar phenomenon. Thus, another of the goals of this study was to begin to explore the 
degree to which the animals’ relationship with the experimenter influenced their responses. 
1.4 Inequity and Cooperation 
It has been hypothesized that a sense of fairness evolved with cooperation. Humans with 
a sense of fairness are proposed to be more likely to succeed in cooperative interactions (Fehr & 
Schmidt, 1999), due to their greater ability to recognize and thus avoid cooperative interactions 
or partners which are not in their best interests, such as freeloaders who will exploit a shared 
effort without splitting the outcome. Many social nonhuman primate species (and those in other 
taxa) also cooperate both in the wild and in laboratory experiments, and thus this link between 
cooperation and inequity may exist in species besides humans (see Price & Brosnan, 2012, for an 
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overview). Indeed, the current study focuses on capuchin monkeys, who cooperate both in the 
wild (Rose, 1997) and in the laboratory (de Waal & Berger, 2000). 
Capuchin monkeys can monitor their own contributions to a cooperative activity and the 
resulting outcomes, as well as a partner’s (Brosnan, 2011), and consequently, can recognize 
whether they are being exploited and determine whether to continue contributing (Hatfield et al., 
1978). Therefore, a negative response to inequity may be a signal to a partner that they are not 
being fair.  However, the question remains as to where the negative response is being directed – 
towards the conspecific, or towards another source, such as the experimenter? Specifically, when 
the monkeys complete a task with the experimenter, do they view the experimenter as the 
cooperative partner, or do they view the experimenter as a mediator for a cooperative task 
involving subject and partner? It presumably makes a difference in responses depending on 
whether monkeys perceive themselves as cooperating with the experimenter or a conspecific. 
Determining whether the negative response to inequity is directed towards the 
experimenter or the conspecific can also tell us about how individuals perceive this interaction. If 
an individual responds differently when an experimenter is present than when an experimenter is 
absent, this indicates that they see the experimenter as the cause of the inequity, which may 
indirectly imply that the individual has some understanding of human’s intentions. Humans 
respond less strongly to distributions determined by a computer than by other humans (Blount, 
1995), and cooperation with a human partner rather than a computer is associated with more 
brain activity for striatal mechanisms related to reward (Rilling et al., 2002), demonstrating that 
humans are sensitive to intentionality. Some nonhuman primates have demonstrated the ability to 
understand the intentional actions of others (Call et al., 2004), so while we cannot assume similar 
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underlying neural mechanisms, such similarity in outcomes would provide some evidence that 
they may understand aspects of intent.  
On the other hand, if subjects do not respond differently to the presence or absence of the 
experimenter, then the results imply that the subjects are focused on the outcome of the 
interaction, not the underlying causes (i.e., not the experimenter).  This has several implications.  
First, it implies that they are more outcome-focused than intent-focused, although the fact that 
they respond more strongly to a partner getting an outcome than to the mere presence of a 
higher-value outcome means that this is still a social response.  We also cannot disentangle that 
they are sensitive to intent, but are more focused on conspecifics than humans.  It is interesting to 
note that there may be less cause for concern over experimenter effects if subjects are insensitive 
to the presence of the experimenter, not because the experimenter is not a cause of bias, but 
because the subjects are not paying as much attention to the experimenter. 
1.5 Purpose 
In the current study, I used a novel methodology to assess whether the presence or 
absence of the experimenter affects the types of responses to inequity in one species of 
nonhuman primate (the capuchin monkey, Cebus apella). The primary goal of this study was to 
compare the responses to inequity when an experimenter was absent from the room versus when 
an experimenter was present and was “providing rewards.” There was an identical procedure for 
both conditions, so the only variable that changed was whether the experimenter was physically 
present, touching the reward dispensers. These results would determine whether the monkeys 
were responding to the experimenter’s presence or the conspecific’s outcomes. If the monkeys 
respond to inequity when an experimenter is present, but not when the experimenter is absent, 
this would imply that the monkeys are responding to the experimenter’s actions, rather than the 
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reward distribution.  From this we could infer that the subjects are sensitive to the intent of the 
individual that creates the inequity.  If the subjects respond the same regardless of whether the 
experimenter is present, this would imply that the monkeys are responding to the distribution, not 
the actions that led to that distribution.  From this we could infer that the subjects are not as 
sensitive to intent or cause as they are to outcome.  I do not expect the monkeys to respond to 
inequity when the experimenter is absent, but to do so when the experimenter is present, due to 
earlier results showing inequity when the experimenter was present (all previous studies have 
involved a present experimenter).  However, if the subjects respond more strongly in the absence 
of an experimenter, this might imply a mediating effect of the experimenter on their willingness 
to respond negatively to inequity.  
In order to do this, I developed a new methodology that allowed for both a task and a 
means of distribution of the food rewards to the appropriate monkey without human mediation. I 
created a joint-computer task that required the monkeys to expend effort to earn rewards, which 
were distributed by an automatic dispenser.  Monkeys were separated from one another, which 
ensured that each monkey received its intended reward.  
2     GENERAL METHODS 
 
2.1 Subjects and Housing 
Data were collected on 11 capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) housed at Georgia State 
University’s Language Research Center (LRC) in Atlanta, Georgia. Capuchins came from two 
social groups housed at the LRC; Group 1 consisted of 2 adult males, 2 adult females, and 2 
juvenile females, and Group 2 consisted of 3 adult males, 2 adult females, and 1 juvenile male. 
All subjects were housed in social groups at the LRC and had indoor/outdoor access and 
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extensive environmental enrichment (climbing structures, barrels, swings, and other toys). All 
subjects had ad libitum access to water and were fed their usual diet consisting of primate chow, 
fruits and vegetables throughout the study. At no time were the subjects food or water deprived.  
No subject was tested twice in the same day. 
All subjects were tested in pairs. These pairs were to remain the same throughout the 
study, although individuals that did not consistently complete the task were removed from these 
pairings and some individuals were re-paired (see Appendix A). All subjects participated 
voluntarily, coming when called to the testing cages in their indoor living areas for the 
experiment. Separating subjects out from their social group in this way limited distractions 
during the experiment. Animals were initially chosen to participate in the study if they reliably 
separated and had a potential partner that they tolerated from within their social group that also 
reliably separated. 
2.2 Computer Task 
The computer task was a CHASE task, in which individuals used a joystick to move a 
cursor on the computer screen so as to make contact with each of two moving green circles on 
the screen.  The form of the task involved a white background with red cursors and green circles 
as targets. At the beginning of a trial, both circles appeared on the screen.  The circles moved 
randomly and independently deflected off the borders of the playing area. Each circle 
disappeared when contacted with the cursor, and when both circles had been contacted, the 
individual received his/her reward.  
Because this was a joint task, individuals shared a split screen (a black line split the 
screen in half) and each individual had a view of his/her own and the partner’s cursor 
movements. Individuals alternated taking turns; when it was one player’s turn, both circles 
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appeared on the playing individual’s side of the screen while the non-playing individual’s side of 
the screen went blank (with no cursor). Once the playing individual completed the trial and 
received the corresponding rewards, a new trial began for the partner while the other side of the 
screen in turn went blank.  The ITI (inter-trial interval) and the presence of a partner’s cursor 
varied depending on the version of the program (see Section 3.5.1 and Table 1). Within an 
individual’s turn, any continuous 30 seconds without deflecting the joystick was defined as a 
“refusal.”  A refusal resulted in the individual losing his/her chance to play that trial, and play 
reverted back to the partner.   
Table 1. Summary of modifications made across studies. 
Study ITI 
Components on Screen 
Playing Individual Non-playing Individual 
Studies 1-4 10 seconds Moveable cursor + targets Blank screen 
Study 5 5 seconds Moveable cursor + targets Moveable cursor, no targets 
 
All subjects completed the same version of the CHASE task (involving touching two 
moving targets with the cursor, as described above). Once an individual touched both targets, an 
automatic dispenser released one of two reward types, either a low value reward (LVR - 1 
reward) or a high value reward (HVR - 4 rewards).  Each session involved 60 alternating trials 
for each individual (i.e., 120 trials total). All sessions were run to completion. Thus, individuals’ 
statistics referred to the number of trials completed or refused out of 60 trials per session. Not all 
pairs of monkeys completed the same number of sessions within each study (see Appendix A), 
however final statistics are based on each pair’s full set of 8 completed sessions. Although 
computer tasks have not been used specifically to look at the response to inequity alone, all of 
the capuchin subjects had prior experience using the described CHASE task (e.g., Beran & 
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Evans, 2009;Evans et al., 2008) and were used to paying attention to differential rewards through 
tasks that examined economic decision-making (e.g., Brosnan et al., 2011b). 
2.3 Setup 
Each pair consisted of a subject and partner. Each individual in a pair was tested in both 
roles. In order to ensure that rewards would be distributed to the intended individual, all subjects 
were separated from their partners by a clear barrier (see Section 1.2.3). This procedure with the 
barrier is consistent with previous joint-computer studies (Brosnan et al., 2011b). One concern, 
as noted above, is that subjects’ responses to inequity may be influenced by proximity to the 
partner, thus the barrier may inhibit reactions. However, use of the barrier was necessary to 
appropriately distribute rewards, and there is evidence that capuchins will still respond to 
inequity when physically separated (Brosnan et al., 2010a; Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; Fletcher, 
2008; Takimoto et al., 2010; van Wolkenten et al., 2007).  
Capuchin monkeys were tested in a testing box (24 in. tall, 56 in. long, 27.5 in. wide) 
attached to the home enclosures. The testing box had a pair of clear panels separating the animals 
from the computer apparatus, allowing the monkeys clear visual access to both their and their 
partner’s side of the computer screen, with metal mesh surrounding the sides of the panel (Figure 
1). A clear barrier was also used to separate the two monkeys into separate testing areas (each 28 
in. long and 27.5 in. wide), but allowed them to see each other, each other’s work, and each 
other’s rewards. Only one animal pair was tested at a time. 
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Figure 1. Diagram of the joint testing box (front view). Joystick controllers are inserted into 
the mounts (A). Reward pellets fall into the funnels (B) and travel through clear plastic tubing 
(C) into reward cups (D). 
The computer rested on a moveable cart. A large screen was placed at the monkey’s eye-
level to allow the animals to sit in front of the caging in their respective areas and watch a split-
screen (Figure 2). Joysticks were connected to the computer on either side of the cart, and were 
inserted into mounts built into the clear front panels, allowing the animals to control a cursor 
with the joystick. Two automatic reward dispensers were attached to the cart on both sides and 
fruit-flavored pellets sat at the top of each reservoir. Each reward was released one-by-one from 
a reward dispenser and rolled down clear tubing into one of two clear PVC pipes that were 
attached to the metal mesh and positioned centrally between subject and partner, landing into an 
individual’s respective reward cup that was attached to the inside of the testing box (Figures 1 
and 2). The reward delivery and reward cups were visible to both individuals through the clear 
barrier or mesh separation.   
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Figure 2. Diagram of the joint testing box (side view). Reward pellets sit in the reservoir (A) 
and are released by an automatic dispenser (B). Monkeys have a split-screen view on the 
computer screen (C) and control a cursor by moving a joystick on the controller (D) to touch 
moving targets. 
It was vital that the monkeys could see each other’s rewards as clearly as possible. If they 
did not know what their partner got, they would not realize that the outcomes were inequitable.  
In previous inequity studies with the token exchange task, the experimenter would hold up each 
individual’s reward so that both monkeys could see it before handing it over to the intended 
individual. However, because this new methodology required automatic reward distribution, the 
clear tubing and reward cups situated on either side of the barrier helped ensure the best chance 
for both monkeys to see each other’s pellets being distributed automatically. Additional visual 
and auditory cues were also used to make this reward delivery as noticeable as possible to both 
individuals. As each reward was released from the dispenser, the rewarded player’s side of the 
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screen flashed. In addition, a tone played once for each reward earned.  This tone was the same 
for both individuals.  
The procedure for reward distribution was the same for experimenter present and 
experimenter absent conditions.  In conditions in which there was a human experimenter, the 
experimenter stood behind the screen. The experimenter touched the playing monkey’s 
corresponding dispenser, as if she were controlling the release of the pellet into the dispenser.  
The experimenter knew ahead of time which reward each individual would be receiving based on 
the type of equity condition (Table 2), but she fixed her gaze at a spot on the caging during 
testing; thus, she could not see the screen and the reward distribution was automatic, which 
limited inadvertent cuing  (see Section 1.3.1).   
 
Table 2. Summary of the different test types and conditions. 
Experimenter 
condition 
Test type Equity condition 
Number of Rewards 
Subject Partner 
Experimenter 
present or absent 
Low equity control Low equity 1 1 
High equity control High equity 4 4 
Inequity 
Disadvantageous 
inequity 
1 4 
Advantageous 
inequity 
4 1 
 
Prior to the beginning of testing, the monkeys were acclimated to the joint-computer 
testing box setup. Whereas the capuchins previously have participated in joint-computerized 
testing in smaller individual testing boxes (Brosnan et al., 2011b), as well as joint manual tasks 
in the larger testing box, they had never participated in a joint-computer task in the larger testing 
box. For the acclimation period, the setup was the same as described above, except that the 
computer screen was not turned on and joystick controllers were not attached for the monkeys to 
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manipulate (therefore, no task was required). Each monkey pair was given a total of two 10-
minute sessions, on separate days, in which the experimenter manually provided them pellets by 
pushing the release button on the automatic dispenser. The monkeys received two pellets every 
30 seconds (40 pellets in total). This also functioned to train the monkeys to associate the 
experimenter with the release of rewards (although in the actual testing sessions, it would be 
automatic). All sessions were videotaped with two Canon cameras, one pointing toward each 
side of the testing box to capture both players’ behaviors and proximity to the joystick. The 
reaction time (time it took to first touch the joystick from the start of the trial) and completion 
time (time it took to touch both targets) were also recorded. 
2.4 Conditions 
To determine whether the monkeys responded to inequity, responses in control tests were 
contrasted with responses in inequity tests (Table 2). There were four equity-type conditions: low 
equity (LE), in which both players received 1 reward (1 reward for subject, 1 reward for partner), 
high equity (HE), in which both players received 4 rewards (4 rewards for subject, 4 rewards for 
partner), disadvantageous inequity (DI), in which the subject received less than the partner (1 
reward for subject, 4 rewards for partner), and advantageous inequity (AI), in which the subject 
received more than the partner (4 rewards for subject, 1 reward for partner). These four 
conditions were randomized across sessions, and individuals were tested in both subject and 
partner roles. In addition, there were two experimenter conditions: experimenter present and 
experimenter absent. Thus, each pair of monkeys completed 8 sessions: 2 low equity, 2 high 
equity, and 4 inequity (two when the subject was disadvantaged and two when the subject was 
advantaged). Half of these sessions were experimenter present and the other half were 
experimenter absent.   
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3     STUDIES 1-5, METHODS AND RESULTS 
3.1 Study 1 
3.1.1 Study 1 Methods 
I initially tested five pairs of monkeys (see Appendix A, Study 1) that had reliably 
worked together on previous joint-computer tasks (Price et al., in prep). The computer task, 
setup, and conditions were as described above. 
3.1.2 Study 1 Results 
Unexpectedly, 4 of 10 monkeys (affecting 3 of the 5 pairs) failed to participate in the 
study, completing 0 trials within one or two sessions, and thus never received a reward.  Analysis 
of the video tapes revealed that these monkeys did not even approach the joystick, indicating that 
this failure was not an inability to do the task per se, but an unwillingness to participate (see 
Appendix A). The remaining 6 monkeys actively participated (Appendix A). Because the 4 
monkeys that failed to participate represented a large proportion of the subjects and in order to 
prevent experience effects, I decided to terminate the study as soon as the problem emerged, 
which was after 5 of 6 pairs had completed two sessions.   
3.1.3 Study 1 Discussion 
This study was aborted as soon as it became apparent that there might be a problem with 
the task or setup. After 2 sessions, only two of the monkeys completed, on average, more than 
half of the trials in the session. To remain blind to results, I did not look at the number of refusals 
after each session was completed, but upon noticing a pattern of inactivity among several 
monkeys, I examined the data. The low patterns of responses could not be explained by the type 
of condition (i.e., low response rates were not limited to low equity conditions or to those 
individuals that were disadvantaged).These monkeys had all previously participated in joint-
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computerized tasks with a shared screen and separate joysticks and pellet dispensers, as in the 
current study; however, as the apparatus was modified (in order to maximize the degree to which 
they could see their partner’s rewards) there was the possibility that their refusals were due to 
unfamiliarity with the novel apparatus.  To investigate this, I tested all of the pairs on a familiar 
joint-computerized task that they had recently completed (the Chicken Game; Price et al., in 
prep). If subjects’ performance on the Chicken Game with the new apparatus differed from the 
previous study with the original apparatus, then this difference was likely caused by the 
apparatus. On the other hand, if their performance was the same, then the refusal to participate 
was due to some element of the current task. 
3.2 Study 2 
3.2.1 Study 2 Methods 
For this stage, I tested the same five monkey pairs (Appendix A) on a joint economic 
decision-making game called the Chicken Game (Price at al., in prep), using the same setup in 
the joint testing box as in Study 1. The Chicken Game required the monkeys to make joint 
decisions that would affect both of the monkeys’ payoff outcomes. Pairs shared a split-screen 
view and could see their partner’s decision. At the beginning of each trial, two different icons 
representing two separate strategies appeared on both players’ sides of the screen. Each 
individual had to move his or her cursor to touch one of the two icons, and each player’s 
selection stayed up on the screen until the monkeys received their payoff outcomes. Depending 
on each individual’s selection, subject and partner received different payoff outcomes (ranging 
from 0 to 4 pellets). All pairs had participated in this computerized game for the past year, but 
they had never played in the joint testing box.  
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In each of the previous Chicken Game sessions, all pairs had routinely completed 200 
trials (the maximum number of trials offered) within two hours, so for the current study, pairs 
were given two hours to complete as many trials as they could within each session. To meet 
criterion, pairs had to complete two full sessions of 200 trials in this time on two separate days.  
If pairs completed over 100 trials by the end of the session, I gave them another attempt the 
following day; however, if pairs failed to reach 100 trials for two sessions in a row, testing was 
terminated. Pairs that passed criterion were re-tested on the inequity task following the procedure 
described in Study 1. 
3.2.2 Study 2 Results 
Three of five pairs passed criterion (Appendix A, Study 2).  Of these pairs, two of the six 
monkeys (affecting two of the three pairs) subsequently did not participate in the inequity task, 
completing 0 trials across all sessions (Appendix A) until testing was aborted after 2 or 3 
sessions.  
3.2.3 Study 2 Discussion 
The results suggest that the difficulties were caused by both the apparatus and the task. 
Considering the first of these, two pairs were dropped from this study when they failed to reach 
criterion on the Chicken Game, with which they had previous experience. This suggests that their 
failure to work was due to the novel testing apparatus. Whereas each pair was provided with two 
10-minute acclimation sessions receiving free rewards (see Section 2.3), no task was provided 
during acclimation.  This was done in part to make sure the monkeys focused on the new type of 
reward distribution (receiving rewards automatically in the joint testing box rather than being 
handed rewards), but meant that the apparatus was still largely novel. I also wanted to ensure that 
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the monkeys paid attention to the novel type of pellet delivery, which involved the pellets 
traveling through the clear tubing and landing in the reward cups.   
Of the six monkeys who passed the task criterion, two individuals subsequently failed to 
participate in the inequity test (Appendix A), suggesting that some aspect of the inequity task 
was aversive. For the next study, I re-paired the monkeys to determine whether the difficulties on 
the inequity task would persist across new pairs. Individuals were dropped from those pairs in 
which either player did not pass the Chicken Game criterion or did not participate in the inequity 
task following passing criterion. Three new pairs were created (two pairs using monkeys that had 
both been previously tested in Studies 1 and 2, and one pair using a previously tested monkey in 
Studies 1 and 2 and one that had never been tested).   
3.3 Study 3 
3.3.1 Study 3 Methods 
I paired only monkeys that performed trials in the previous experiment and re-tested them 
following the procedures described in Study 1 (Appendix A). I continued to test one pair that had 
consistently met the criteria in the two previous studies. To determine whether the performance 
problems were persisting across the new pairs, each pair was provided 4 sessions. Each 
individual had to reach a criterion of an average of 20 completed trials over 4 sessions in order to 
continue testing.     
3.3.2 Study 3 Results 
Six of eight individuals passed criterion for the four sessions (Appendix A, Study 3). One 
failed to do so after 4 sessions, but her partner met criterion.  For another pair, testing was 
terminated early after two sessions. In this pair, one individual was likely to pass criterion but her 
partner completed only 3 trials within two sessions. Upon inspection, this was not due to 
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rewards; this individual completed only one trial when advantaged and two trials when 
disadvantaged. Moreover, video footage confirmed that he only touched the joystick once in one 
session and twice in the other session. Therefore, testing was terminated as soon as this 
motivational problem emerged to prevent possible experience effects in both monkeys in the 
pair. As a comparison, the subject with the second lowest average had completed 13 trials and 7 
trials respectively in her first two sessions. Because this subject completed at least some trials in 
each session, she was not dropped even though she ultimately did not pass criterion after four 
sessions. The two pairs for which both monkeys passed criterion completed all 8 sessions.  
For the two pairs for which both monkeys passed criterion, behavior in the subsequent 
eight testing sessions did not differ across equity conditions in any of the dependent measures, 
whether the experimenter was present (refusals: X
2
(3)=.600, p=.896; average reaction time: 
X
2
(3)=1.8, p=.615; average completion time: X
2
(3)=1.5, p=.682) or absent (refusals: X
2
(3)=2.1, 
p=.552; average reaction time: X
2
(3)=3.9, p=.272; average completion time: X
2
(3)=4.5, p=.212). 
The monkeys also did not respond differently to any condition in the experimenter present versus 
absent conditions for refusals (LE: z= -.730, p=.465; HE: z= -.730, p=.465; DI: z= -1.095, 
p=.273; AI: z= -1.461, p=.144), average reaction time (LE: z= -1.095, p=.273; HE: z= -1.461, 
p=.144; DI: z= -1.095, p=.273; AI: z= -1.826, p=.068), and average completion time (LE: z= -
1.095, p=.273; HE: z= -1.461, p=.144; DI: z= -1.095, p=.273; AI: z= -.365, p=.715). An 
overview of results can be found in Figures 3 and 4.     
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Figure 3. Overview of mean refusals out of 60 trials across the 8 conditions in Study 3 
(n=4). Equity conditions are LE (low equity), HE (high equity), DI (disadvantageous inequity), 
and AI (advantageous inequity). 
 
 
Figure 4. Overview of average reaction time and average completion time across 60 trials 
in the 8 conditions in Study 3 (n=4). Equity conditions are LE (low equity), HE (high equity), 
DI (disadvantageous inequity), and AI (advantageous inequity). 
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3.3.3 Study 3 Discussion 
Two pairs passed criterion and completed all 8 sessions of the inequity task. It is possible 
that the problems experienced in Studies 1 and 2 were due to individual motivation issues, 
because the individuals that were re-paired continued to work well in their new pairs. However, 
individuals within the other two pairs showed low response rates, despite having worked well in 
their previous pair. 
The four monkeys that completed the study did not respond differently across equity 
conditions or experimenter conditions. It is possible that the sample size (n=4) was too small to 
find any effects, or it may also be that the task and setup prevented these monkeys from noticing 
or responding to differential reward outcomes. Therefore, to clarify this issue, I decided to make 
modifications in order to help the two remaining pairs who did not meet criterion and therefore 
to increase the sample size.  Prior to each inequity task, I tested the monkeys on the Chicken 
Game for 10 minutes to rule out the possibility that a failure to participate was due to a lack of 
motivation. If monkeys worked on the Chicken Game but then failed to participate in the 
inequity task immediately following, it would indicate that their disinterest in participating was 
due to the task, not the apparatus or a generalized lack of interest.  However, if the monkeys 
failed to complete the Chicken Game, this would mean that the lack of interest extended beyond 
the inequity task and was a more general lack of motivation to work that day, and consequently, I 
did not test them on the inequity task. 
3.4 Study 4 
3.4.1 Study 4 Methods 
The two pairs that did not pass criterion in Study 3 were tested on the Chicken Game, 
following the setup in Study 2. Individuals were provided the chance to complete as many trials 
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as they could within 10 minutes to receive rewards. On average, individuals typically completed 
a minimum of 60 trials within 60 minutes; therefore, the criterion was set so that if each 
individual completed at least 10 trials in the 10 minutes, they were immediately tested on the 
inequity task, starting with conditions that they had yet to experience.   
3.4.2 Study 4 Results 
One pair passed Chicken Game criterion, but immediately following, one subject in the 
pair completed a low number of trials on the inequity task (5; see Appendix A, Study 4) and only 
touched the joystick 6 times. Upon further inspection, this session was an advantageous inequity 
condition in which this particular individual was receiving the better reward; therefore, it was 
clear that this was not due to frustration due to inequity or receiving a low value reward in 
comparison with the possible payoffs of four pellets in the Chicken Game (the highest reward 
possibility was four pellets in both the Chicken Game and inequity task). The other pair failed to 
pass criterion.  Because this test requires both individuals’ input to receive rewards, either one or 
both individuals did not participate long enough to reach the 10 trials (Appendix A).  
3.4.3 Study 4 Discussion 
Again, the results from this study indicated problems with both the apparatus and the 
inequity task. One pair failed to pass the Chicken Game criterion; because this game requires 
both individuals to make a selection before receiving rewards, the failure to complete the task 
may have been influenced by a single monkey or both monkeys not participating. This indicated 
either a dislike of the new apparatus or a more generalized lack of motivation to work. The other 
pair passed the Chicken Game criterion but on the subsequent inequity task one individual failed 
to participate despite receiving the better rewards. Unlike the other pair that refused to work on  
either task, this individual’s pattern of behavior indicates that he was willing to participate on a 
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familiar task but lost motivation to work when the task was switched to the inequity task 
immediately following. Based on the collective results from Studies 1-4, I modified some 
parameters of the task to help the remaining monkeys better understand it (Table 1). It is possible 
that some monkeys found the ITI to be too long, which might have caused them not to view the 
task as a joint task for which they should carefully pay attention to their partner’s outcomes. 
Monkeys might have also been confused because the non-playing individual did not have a 
cursor on his side of the screen. Therefore, the non-playing individual moved his joystick, and 
when the cursor movements did not correlate with his joystick movements, he consequently 
might have lost interest or become frustrated. These two factors combined might have caused 
monkeys not to realize that the task was a joint task in which the players alternated turns, which 
may have been a motivating factor for the lack of participation.    
3.5 Study 5 
3.5.1 Study 5 Methods 
I modified the inequity task parameters (Table 1) by shortening the ITI to keep the 
monkeys’ attention and adding a functioning cursor on the non-playing individual’s side of the 
screen so that the individual might be more aware of their cursor movements versus their 
partner’s cursor movements. The two pairs were tested following the setup in Study 1. 
3.5.2 Study 5 Results 
Both pairs completed all eight sessions (Appendix A, Study 5). When the experimenter 
was present, their behavior differed across equity conditions in refusals (X
2
(3)=8.333, p=.040) 
but not average reaction time (X
2
(3)=.900, p=.825) or average completion time (X
2
(3)=.900, 
p=.825). Post-hoc analysis with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests was conducted with a Bonferroni 
correction applied, resulting in a significance level set at p < .0083.  With this correction, there 
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were no significant differences between any of the equity conditions. When the experimenter 
was absent, the monkeys’ behavior did not differ across equity conditions (refusals: X2(3)=3.9, 
p=.272; average reaction time: X
2
(3)=6.30, p=.098; average completion time: X
2
(3)=1.5, p=.682). 
They also did not respond differently to any condition in the experimenter present versus absent 
conditions for refusals (LE: z= .000, p=1; HE: z= -1.069, p=.285; DI: z= -.272, p=.785; AI: z= -
1.826, p=.068), average reaction time (LE: z= -.730, p=.465; HE: z= -.730, p=.465; DI: z= -
1.461, p=.144; AI: z= .000, p=1), and average completion time (LE: z= -.730, p=.465; HE: z= -
.730, p=.465; DI: z= -1.095, p=.273; AI: z= -.730, p=.465). An overview of results can be found 
in Figures 5 and 6. 
 
Figure 5. Overview of mean refusals out of 60 trials across the 8 conditions in Study 5 
(n=4). Equity conditions are LE (low equity), HE (high equity), DI (disadvantageous inequity), 
and AI (advantageous inequity). 
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Figure 6. Overview of average reaction time and average completion time across 60 trials 
in the 8 conditions in Study 5 (n=4). Equity conditions are LE (low equity), HE (high equity), 
DI (disadvantageous inequity), and AI (advantageous inequity). 
 
3.5.3 Study 5 Discussion 
With the modifications, two additional pairs of monkeys completed all 8 sessions of the 
inequity task. Given that I found no statistically significant comparisons (except the overall 
Friedman’s for Study 5, for which there were no significant comparisons following Bonferroni 
corrections), I combined the data from Study 3 and Study 5 to increase the sample size and re-ran 
the analyses.  
3.6 Combined Data 
3.6.1 Combined Data Results 
I analyzed the combined data using factorial repeated-measures GLM. I conducted 
analyses across the full 60 trials for refusals, average reaction time, and average completion time 
(see Figures 7 and 8 for overview). For all results reported, the assumption of sphericity was met.  
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Experimenter presence or absence did not have a significant effect on any dependent 
variables (refusals: X
2
(1)=2.17, p=.14; average reaction time: X
2
(1)=.74, p=.39; average 
completion time: X
2
(1)=.65, p=.42). The type of equity condition did have a significant effect on 
refusals (X
2
(3)=14.59, p=.002) but not average reaction time (X
2
(3)=4.96, p=.17) or average 
completion time (X
2
(3)=2.74, p=.43).  There were no interactions between experimenter and 
equity condition for any of the dependent variables (refusals: X
2
(3)=.43, p=.93; average reaction 
time: X
2
(3)=3.22, p=.36; average completion time: X
2
(3)=1.35, p=.72). Planned contrasts 
revealed that subjects refused significantly more in the low equity condition compared to any 
other condition, b = -3.33, t(42) = -2.63, p=.012 (Table 4). After collapsing the data to compare 
performance as a function of absolute food amounts, subjects’ refusals differed significantly 
depending on whether they received a single reward or four rewards, z= -2.1, p=.036. 
I also examined whether refusal rates changed across time as the session progressed. 
Refusal rates significantly decreased across trials in the high equity condition (rs(960) = -.147, 
p<.001) and low equity condition (rs(960) = -.149, p<.001), but not the advantageous inequity 
condition (rs(960) = -.010, p=.751) nor the disadvantageous inequity condition (rs(960) = -.052, 
p=.107). Comparing the correlation coefficients from each condition confirmed the above 
findings. The correlation between refusal rates across the duration of the session in the high 
equity condition differed significantly from the correlations between refusal rates across the 
duration of the session in the disadvantageous inequity condition (z= -2.1, p=.036) and the 
advantageous inequity condition (z= -3.02, p=.003) but not the low equity condition (z= 0.04, 
p=.968). The correlation between refusal rates across the duration of the session in the low 
equity condition differed significantly from the correlation between refusal rates across the 
duration of the session in the disadvantageous inequity condition (z= -2.15, p=.032) and the 
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advantageous inequity condition (z= -3.07, p=.002). The correlations between refusal rates 
across the duration of the session in the advantageous inequity condition and the 
disadvantageous inequity condition did not differ significantly, z= -0.92, p=.358.   
 
Figure 7. Overview of mean refusals out of 60 trials across the 8 conditions in Studies 3 and 
5 (combined data, n=8). Equity conditions are LE (low equity), HE (high equity), DI 
(disadvantageous inequity), and AI (advantageous inequity). 
 
 
Figure 8. Overview of average reaction time and average completion time across 60 trials 
in the 8 conditions in Studies 3 and 5 (combined data, n=8). Equity conditions are LE (low 
equity), HE (high equity), DI (disadvantageous inequity), and AI (advantageous inequity). 
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Table 3. Results for analysis of contrasts for refusals. Equity conditions are LE (low equity), 
HE (high equity), DI (disadvantageous inequity), and AI (advantageous inequity). Refusals in the 
low equity condition differed significantly from any other condition, b = -3.33, t(42) = -2.63, 
p=.012. 
Contrast b SEb df t p 
Experimenter 
Present vs. 
Absent 
-2.84 1.79 7 -1.59 0.16 
LE vs. other 
conditions 
-3.33 1.26 42 -2.63 0.012 
DI vs. AI 4.88 5.06 42 0.96 0.34 
DI vs. other 
conditions 
-0.42 2.19 42 -0.19 0.85 
 
3.6.2 Combined Data Discussion 
Overall, the pattern of results suggests that monkeys were sensitive to receiving a single 
reward, but were not sensitive to either their reward as compared to their partner’s (i.e., equity 
versus inequity) or the presence of the experimenter.  In the combined data, I found that the 
overall number of refusals differed significantly across equity conditions, and the monkeys 
refused the most when both individuals were receiving a low value reward. Moreover, although 
this was not statistically significant, monkeys also refused at high rates when disadvantaged as 
compared to a partner, which was the other condition in which they received a single reward, 
suggesting that the monkeys were sensitive to getting a single reward as opposed to the four 
rewards. Indeed, this was confirmed after analyzing performance as a function of food amounts, 
which revealed that the monkeys’ refusals differed significantly depending on what amount of 
reward they received. Additionally, in no condition did the subjects’ behavior change depending 
on whether the experimenter was present.  
However, there was one finding that hints to the possibility that subjects were responding 
to the relative equity of the rewards.  Although the overall number of refusals did not differ 
across conditions, the rate of refusal did.  In the combined data, the subjects’ rate of refusal did 
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not change in the two conditions that resulted in unequal outcomes, whether they were 
advantaged (AI) or disadvantaged (DI).  On the other hand, they were less likely to refuse across 
the course of the session in the two conditions that resulted in equal outcomes, whether they 
received the preferred outcome (HE) or the less preferred one (LE), possibly indicating a social 
facilitation effect when their outcome matched their partner’s.  This finding is the one indication 
that the subjects noticed when their outcome differed from their partner’s, regardless of whether 
they were relatively advantaged or disadvantaged.  This result hints that this procedure might 
yield valuable insights with a larger sample size and an adapted procedure that takes in to 
account the changes that were in place in Study 5. 
4 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
My hypothesis that monkeys’ responses would be influenced by the presence of the 
experimenter was not supported.  Monkeys’ behavior did not change in any condition depending 
on whether the experimenter was present or absent.  However, it may still be surprising that the 
presence of the experimenter did not change their willingness to work and/or accept rewards 
(even if this was independent of the reward inequity, or lack thereof) for several reasons. First, it 
remains unclear what role the experimenter may play in a social interaction. On the one hand, the 
experimenter may provide additional cues that the context is a social one, causing the subjects to 
pay more attention. On the other hand, the experimenter may be distracting, as a recent study 
suggests; macaques performed significantly better on an object-choice task when the 
experimenter was hidden behind a curtain and only the arm of the experimenter was visible, 
suggesting that the presence of the experimenter distracted the monkeys away from the salient 
cues in the task (Schmitt et al., 2014). Second, whereas the procedures and apparatus were 
carefully constructed so as to remove interaction with the experimenter and prevent cuing, it is 
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challenging to eliminate all unintentional cuing. Whereas I tried to stay as consistent as possible 
in my movements as the experimenter and maintain my gaze straight ahead during testing, 
nonhuman primates are sensitive to eye movements (Povinelli & Eddy, 1996) and animals may 
be sensitive to subtle body movements (Johnson, 1913), such as respiration, posture, and the 
tensing and relaxing of muscles - processes that would be impossible for an experimenter to have 
full control over. Moreover, it is possible that the monkeys’ unwillingness to work provided 
experimental feedback that negatively affected my mood, which conceivably could have further 
influenced unintentional cuing and changed monkeys’ behavior (perhaps leading them to work 
less in the presence of the experimenter). Third, I have had years of experience with these 
monkeys and they are familiar with interacting with me, both in terms of experimental and 
husbandry-type interactions. Consequently, because capuchin monkeys can discriminate humans 
(Paukner et al., 2009), there was a risk that my past experience with these monkeys might 
influence their perception of me as the experimenter, and I thought they might be more willing to 
work in my presence because they are used to receiving rewards from me. So while on the one 
hand this is surprising, on the other hand it is good news that the experimenter’s presence does 
not always influence behavior. 
A second area of interest is why we did not see a strong response to inequity in this study, 
as has been found in some others (Brosnan et al., 2010b; Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; Fletcher, 
2008; Takimoto et al., 2010; Takimoto & Fujita, 2011; Talbot et al., in prep; van Wolkenten et 
al., 2007; but see Fontenot et al., 2007; Silberberg et al., 2009; Talbot et al., in prep). In this 
study, the monkeys’ responses seem to have been more strongly driven by their own immediate 
outcomes rather than how their outcomes compared to their partner’s (as measured by their 
overall refusal rate).  However, the correlations examining refusal rates across the duration of the 
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different sessions suggest that the monkeys were at least noticing inequity, even if they did not 
refuse more often overall in the inequity conditions. Refusal rates did not change over time in 
either disadvantageous or advantageous inequity conditions, but the monkeys refused less often 
across trials in the low equity and high equity conditions. This outcome is intriguing for several 
reasons.  First, it was independent of the subject’s actual outcome.  This change was based on 
whether their outcome matched their partner’s, not what they got.  Second, it was equally strong 
whether they were more advantaged than a partner or less advantaged.  This may indicate that 
what affected their behavior was the degree to which their outcome was the same as a partner’s, 
possibly indicating that different foods are less preferred regardless of one’s absolute or relative 
outcomes.  Given evidence for both inequity (Brosnan et al., 2010b; Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; 
Fletcher, 2008; Takimoto et al., 2010; Takimoto & Fujita, 2011; Talbot et al., in prep; van 
Wolkenten et al., 2007) and prosocial behavior (Brosnan et al., 2010a; Lakshminarayanan & 
Santos, 2008) in capuchins in previous studies, this is a possibility that deserves further 
exploration.  
A critical question is why the subjects did not respond to inequity in this task.  First, there 
is an indication that they noticed it based on the change in refusal rates across sessions, which 
mirrors earlier findings with capuchins (Brosnan & de Waal, 2004).  However, there were no 
changes in overall refusal rates as in other capuchin studies with different reward distributions.  
There are several possibilities for this.  First, as discussed in Section 1.2.3, subjects’ orientation 
and physical proximity may influence the animals’ behavior. In fact, recent evidence from 
another study using a traditional token exchange procedure suggests that the same capuchin 
subjects did not respond to inequity when a barrier separated individuals, but they did respond in 
at least some circumstances once this barrier was removed (Talbot et al., in prep). Of course, 
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other studies have shown that capuchins do respond to inequity when separated by a barrier 
(Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; Brosnan et al., 2010b; van Wolkenten et al., 2007).  Additionally, 
Talbot and colleagues found that these monkeys did not respond to differences in quantity of the 
same food, whether or not there was a barrier. However, monkeys do discriminate and respond to 
the difference between one and four pellets, as this same magnitude is used in the Chicken Game 
(Price et al., in prep). In the Chicken Game, these differences in rewards are associated with 
additional cues; each monkey in the pair chooses an icon that represents a strategy, and the 
resulting combination of chosen icons is displayed on the screen as the monkeys receive their 
corresponding rewards. Therefore, it is less likely that the magnitude of food rewards was 
problematic, but that the monkeys could not associate how their behavior resulted in a certain 
reward outcome. 
One major challenge to this work was the subjects’ disinterest in participating. This study 
provided evidence that the apparatus setup and the task both contributed to the problem. 
Regarding the former, in several cases, videotape analysis revealed that the monkeys were not 
even approaching the joystick, suggesting that it was not the task (which they never tried) that 
influenced their decision. In Study 2, some pairs failed criterion on a familiar task with which 
they had had previous success, again indicating that the novel testing apparatus was problematic. 
Despite receiving an acclimation period without a required task, subjects did not experience 
actually using the apparatus prior to testing.  This was done to prevent any possible contrast 
effects, in which the monkeys would compare their testing experience to the acclimation period 
(which may have been problematic if their first exposure with the setup mimicked an equity 
session with an experimenter present). In retrospect, giving them prior exposure to the task with 
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the new apparatus would have been a beneficial prerequisite, and would have alerted me to the 
problems much earlier. 
 Moreover, the nature of the task may have influenced the low performance rates, 
although it is unclear which aspect was specifically problematic. There was an indication that the 
inequity task was problematic when, even after monkeys passed criterion for the Chicken Game, 
several subsequently failed to participate on the inequity task. One possibility is the alternation 
inherent in the task. The alternating inequity task was largely structured off a previous study, in 
which these same monkey subjects received extensive training to learn how to alternate taking 
turns on the CHASE task to reward their partner (Parrish et al., in prep). Although subjects in the 
previous study required significant training, they were able to learn it and as a result, I did not 
expect that these monkeys would have difficulty with another alternating task.  The results in 
Study 5 point to two possible influences, the ITI and the presence of a second functional cursor 
for the non-playing monkey.  Considering the first of these, monkeys certainly improved when 
the ITI was shortened from 10 seconds to 5 seconds in Study 5.  However, in Parrish and 
colleagues’ study, monkeys were ultimately able to wait as long as two minutes between turns.  
Whereas their study required significantly more scaffolding to reach these long ITIs, I still find it 
unlikely that the ITI alone influenced subjects’ behavior so significantly.   
The other difference was that in the testing phase of Parrish et al. (in prep), the non-
playing individual’s cursor was frozen in place, whereas in the current study (Studies 1-4), the 
non-playing individual’s cursor was completely absent. Because the non-playing individual did 
not have a cursor on his/her side of the screen, s/he may have been confused about whether s/he 
was controlling the movement on the screen, and s/he may have become frustrated if these 
movements did not correlate with touching the joystick. Supporting this, adding a functional 
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cursor for the non-playing monkey was one of the changes linked to increased success in Study 
5. 
Whereas the issues with the ITI and the cursor cannot be disentangled, it is possible that 
in the current study, the alternating inequity task was not perceived as a joint task, in which both 
individuals should have paid attention to each other’s performance and reward outcomes. It is 
also possible that the monkeys do not perceive the split screen in the way that I expected them to. 
Perhaps a more suitable task would be one that was more cooperative and required both players’ 
inputs. For example, the monkeys could work on a single screen with different cursors and both 
individuals would be required to chase the same moving target to touch it. This might be more 
analogous to a task that requires both players to coordinate expended efforts to obtain rewards.  
Another limitation to this study was finding the balance between staying blind to the 
results as the study progressed and monitoring possible procedural problems to potentially adapt 
the paradigm in the middle of the study. As discussed in the introduction, there is always a risk 
that an experimenter may form a bias based on how the study is progressing, causing 
expectancies for future behavior (Rosenthal & Fode, 1963). For example, if data support a 
hypothesis, it might cause the experimenter to exaggerate an interpretation. If data contradict the 
hypothesis, it might change the mood of the experimenter, who may emit unintentional cues or 
test additional subjects to increase power. For example, in the current study, I expected the 
monkeys to perceive the alternating task as a social one in which their partner mattered, 
however, without testing the monkeys in partner-absent conditions, it was impossible to know 
for sure. I also expected the monkeys to complete a certain number of trials for each session 
based on their efficiency on other computer tasks, therefore, I interpreted the low number of 
trials completed in sessions as problematic. On the other hand, it may be beneficial to track 
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performance on a novel task in order to determine whether subjects understand the contingencies 
of the task; this is especially important in animal research in which the subjects cannot ask 
questions for clarification or give feedback on what may have been confusing. Therefore, there 
needs to be a balance in the risk of experimenter bias and in the risk of poor performance on an 
unknown task. 
One way to approach this problem is by creating objective criteria ahead of time in 
anticipation of problems, which requires tracking results to an extent but is established before 
testing has begun. However, this type of computerized inequity study with the joint testing box 
apparatus had never been attempted before, and so it was difficult to create criterion considering 
all of these new factors. In fact, based on results from Parrish et al. (in prep), it was expected that 
the monkeys were familiar and successful with the alternating CHASE task and were willing to 
wait for long periods in between receiving rewards, so it was surprising that the monkeys were 
not willing to work on this task. Also, because it was a computerized study, I assumed that the 
monkeys would complete a high number of trials because they easily complete 200 trials in other 
types of joint tasks (e.g. the Chicken Game).   
Therefore, as the experimenter, I took the approach of staying as blind as possible to 
performance across the type of equity conditions and only examined the data once it became 
clear that several monkeys were not working.  At this point, I did not want to give monkeys 
further negative experience if the apparatus or task was aversive or frustrating to several 
subjects. For this particular study, I believed it was beneficial to adapt the paradigm as problems 
persisted and it appeared likely early in the study that multiple subjects would not meet criterion. 
Often times, subjects were not even completing a single trial in order to determine what reward 
they were receiving, and as the comparison of rewards was the main requirement for inequity, it 
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was crucial to fix this problem as soon as possible. One of the problems with my approach was 
that different subjects received different numbers of sessions, so each subject had different 
experiences. This made it impossible to compare subjects’ performance, meaning that even 
though I ultimately had four pairs complete the task, it is not clear how subjects may have been 
influenced differently by this different experience.  In the future I would begin by testing all 
pairs on the same sub-selection of four conditions (in randomized order) and establish a criterion 
for average number of responses (as in Study 3); with this method, all pairs would receive the 
same experience with the number of sessions and types of conditions, and I could more properly 
assess differences among performances.  
Of course the aforementioned problems with implementing the study make it difficult to 
extrapolate further; however, I note that the finding that the experimenter did not influence the 
subjects’ behavior (irrespective of inequity condition) is not unprecedented.  Previous research 
found that capuchins did not learn to prefer more reliable experimenters over those who cheated 
them (e.g., gave them less than anticipated; Brosnan & de Waal, 2009; Sheskin et al., 2013), so 
these studies combined with my current results suggest that capuchins are not particularly 
sensitive to either the experimenter’s intent to cheat them (e.g., provide less than offered; 
Brosnan & de Waal, 2009; Sheskin et al., 2013) or to their intent to cause inequity (e.g., the 
current results).  This may be different from chimpanzees, who do learn reputation (Russell et 
al., 2008; Subiaul et al., 2008) and therefore might be expected to respond differently based on 
the presence or absence of an experimenter.  
Future research will be required to explore these questions further. Whereas there was 
tentative evidence that subjects in my study noticed inequity, suggesting the utility of a new 
study with a larger sample size, it is difficult to understand what our findings mean. Nonetheless, 
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experimenter effects remain an important area of research, especially when working with 
animals, and require further attention. Because it is virtually impossible to remove the 
experimenter from the experiment in all testing situations, researchers should have a better 
understanding of what role the experimenter plays overall in an attempt to control for these 
effects as much as possible. Moreover, the relationship between human experimenters and their 
animal subjects is fascinating in and of itself, and has important implications beyond research, 
such as how we can improve life in captivity for animal subjects.     
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APPENDICES  
Appendix A 
Summary of pairs’ performances across studies. Sessions were always run to completion, so all measures of trials completed are out of 60 trials. Study 1 includes 
the number of trials completed on the inequity task and number of joystick touches for pairs that completed 0 of the 60 trials. Study 2 includes whether pairs 
passed Chicken Game criterion (completing two full sessions of 200 trials within two hours on two separate days); if pairs passed criterion, the number of trials 
completed on the subsequent inequity task  is indicated (as well as the number of joystick touches for subjects that completed 0 of 60 trials). Study 3 includes the 
average number of trials completed over four sessions (criterion required an average of 20 trials), and the average number of trials completed over 8 sessions for 
the two pairs that completed the study. An asterisk indicates that the session was terminated early, based on only two sessions of 60 trials. Study 4 includes 
whether pairs passed the Chicken Game criterion (completing at least 10 trials in 10 minutes) and the number of trials completed in the subsequent inequity task 
for individuals that passed criterion. Study 5 includes the average number of trials completed over the 8 sessions for the two pairs that completed the study. 
Pair Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 Study 5 
 
# trials 
completed 
(/60) 
# times joystick 
touched (for 
sessions with 
0/60 trials 
completed) 
Passed 
Chicken 
Game 
criterion? 
# trials 
completed 
for inequity 
task (/60) 
# times joystick 
touched (for 
sessions with 
0/60 trials 
completed) 
Passed 
criterion? 
(avg. of 20 
responses 
over 4 
sessions) 
Avg. # trials 
completed over 
8 sessions (for 2 
pairs that 
completed 
study) 
 
Passed 
Chicken 
Game 
criterion?; 
# trials 
completed 
for inequity 
task (/60) 
Avg. # of trials 
completed over 
8 sessions (for 2 
pairs that 
completed 
study) 
Gambit 19; 12 --- Yes (within 
6 sessions) 
9; 55 --- Yes; 41.5 43.5 
--- --- 
Nkima 24; 11 --- 28; 26 --- Yes; 32.75 26.9 
Wren 4 --- 
No --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Lily 26 --- 
Liam 14; 60 --- 
No --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Logan 14; 0 0 
Drella 54; 31 --- Yes (within 
3 sessions) 
59; 27 --- 
--- --- --- --- 
Griffin 0; 0 5; 0 0; 0 6; 0 
Gabe 0; 0 0; 1 Yes (within 
3 sessions) 
0; 0; 0 3; 0; 0 
--- --- --- --- 
Nala 0; 50 0 35; 4; 60 --- 
Liam 
--- --- --- --- --- 
No; 1.5* 
--- No 
45 
Nala Yes; 37* 46.6 
Wren 
--- --- --- --- --- 
Yes; 22.8 28.5 
--- --- 
Drella Yes; 39.5 38.9 
Widget 
--- --- --- --- --- 
Yes; 29.5 
--- 
Yes; 31 45 
Lily No; 5.75 Yes; 5 16.6 
 
